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Abstract
This article examines the position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians from the Dutch colonial
period to the post-Suharto era and analyses the factors that shaped their position. This article
will focus on the' position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in the aspects of economy, socio-
cultural sphere and politics. Under Dutch colonial rule, which began in the seventeenth
century, the colonial regime enforced the divide-and-rule policy that deterred the interactions
between the Chinese and the indigenous population. The Dutch allowed the Chinese to form
ethnic-based organisations, establish Chinese-language presses and open Chinese-medium
schools as they wanted the Chinese to maintain their "Chinese-ness" in order to keep them as
a distinct ethnic group. Moreover, the Dutch used the Chinese instead of the indigenous
1
.r
" -
population to fill most economic niches in order to prevent the rise of an indigenous merchant
class that might challenge their position. This had further widened the economic disparity
between the Chinese and the indigenous people. During the Sukarno years (1950-1965), the
Chinese continued to enjoy freedom to establish and operate Chinese organisations, Chinese-
language presses and Chinese-medium schools because Sukarno was close to China and
hence was relatively tole;ant to the Chinese in Indonesia. The Chinese were also allowed to
actively getting involved in politics. However, the Sukarno regime introduced a few
discriminatory policies to reduce Chinese economic interests and assist indigenous
businesspeople. During the Suharto's rule (1966-1998), due to the anti-communist politics
associated with the Cold War, the Suharto regime perceived the ethnic Chinese as the
potential 'fifth column' for China and introduced forced assimilation policies to curtail
Chinese culture as well as control the Chinese. The Chinese were also discouraged from
actively getting involved in politics and were only given opportunities to get involved in
business activities. In the post-Suharto era (1998-present), the position of ethnic Chinese
Indonesians has improved considerably as they are now allowed to openly express their
ethnic and cultural identities as well as actively participate in politics. This article argues that
the reversal of attitudes toward the Chinese was catalysed by capital flight and the 'exodus'
of Chinese after the anti-Chinese riots in May 1998. It was also due to the rise of political
leaders who were open-minded and sympathetic to the situation of the Chinese such as
former presidents Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri. Besides that, the rise of
China as an economic power also indirectly changed the attitude of post-Suharto
governments towards Chinese Indonesians. This article concludes that the position of ethnic
Chinese Indonesians was shaped by not only the interests and agendas of the power-holders
but also the anti-communist politics associated with the Cold War, the rise of open-minded
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Indonesian political leaders, Indonesia-China relations and the globalisation of the economic
position of China.
Keywords: Chinese Indonesians, Dutch colonisation, Sukarno, Suharto, post-Suharto era.
Introduction
The ethnic Chinese have always been a small minority in Indonesia. In 1930 they
represented an estimated 2.03 per cent of the total population (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 20). It
was estimated that Chinese Indonesians formed about 1.2 per cent of the total Indonesian
population in both 2000 and 2010 (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 23, Table 2.1; Ananta et al., 2013, p.
14, Table 2).1 Despite their small proportion in the country, it has been widely acknowledged
that ethnic Chinese Indonesians have played an important and vital role in the economic
development of Indonesia. However, it is also undeniable that nowhere have more ethnic
Chinese been discriminated and persecuted during the past centuries than in Indonesia.
Various discrimination and attacks against the Chinese had already taken place during Dutch
colonisation. The discrimination against the Chinese was most severe during Suharto's
presidency (1966-1998) as the state imposed forced assimilation upon them, coercing them to
abandon their ethnic and cultural identities, but at the same time still stigmatising them as
Chinese and restricting them from politics, public service, military and entrance to public
universities. Furthermore, attacks against the Chinese reached its climax in May 1998 amid
the Asian financial crisis when riots against the Chinese broke out in many parts of the
country especially Medan, Jakarta and Solo. It was even alleged that many Chinese women
were brutally tortured, raped and murdered. Suharto' s rule ended amid the financial crisis
when he resigned on 21 May 1998. Ironically, the post-Suharto era saw the significant
improvement in the condition and position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians.
1 This figure was calculated directly from the raw data of the 2000 and 2010 population censuses. The figure,
which is significantly smaller than that in 1930, is based on self-identification. Only those who identified
themselves as Chinese were recorded as ethnic Chinese.
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This article examines the position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians from the Dutch
colonial period to the post-Suharto era. This article looks at major literature on Chinese
Indonesians to identify the factors that shaped their position in the aspects of economy, socio-
cultural sphere and politics.
Pre-colonial Period and Dutch Colonial Rule
The economically privileged position of Chinese Indonesians is largely due to
historical factors. The Chinese were already residents in Java and coastal communities of the
Maluku Islands, Sulawesi, Sumatra and Kalimantan before the arrival of the Dutch. The
Chinese settled in the Indonesian archipelago for trading purposes (Reid, 1993; Sidel, 2006, p.
19). Many local regents appointed Chinese merchants as intermediary traders between
themselves, the indigenous population, and external markets. These local regents preferred
the Chinese to the indigenous population to fill this occupational niche in order to prevent the
rise of an indigenous merchant class that might challenge their position (Reid, 1992, p. 497).
In pre-colonial times, the Chinese in Java and other parts of Southeast Asia could assimilate
into the indigenous population, because increasingly numbers of those who traveled to
Southeast Asia for trade were themselves Muslim (Wertheim, 1965, pp. 46-47; Chua, 2008, p.
31; Skinner, 1996, p. 55; Anderson, 1998, p. 321; Lembong, 2008, p. 48).
Under Dutch colonial rule, which began in the seventeenth century, the Chinese could
no longer be completely assimilated into the indigenous society. According to Mona Lohanda
(1996, p. 1), in the days of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the people in the Indonesian archipelago were classified into Christians
and non-Christians and on a racial basis, westerners (Europeans) and non-westerners (non-
Europeans). Each non-western ethnic group was ruled by local headmen appointed by the
VOC. All Chinese from different speech groups (e.g. Hokkien, Hakka and Hainan) were
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classified as Chinese. The headman of the Chinese community in each locality was known as
'Kapitan Cina' (Chinese captain) (Lohanda, 1996). Like the local regents before them, the
VOC used the Chinese as middlemen between the Dutch and the indigenous population
(Suryadinata, 1988, p. 262; Chua, 2008, p. 31; Hoadley, 1988). After the collapse of the VOC
,
in 1800, its territories were taken over by the Dutch colonial government. In 1854, the
colonial government divided the population of the Dutch East Indies into three groups
(Govaars, 2005, p. 20). The first group was European who formed the upper level. The
middle level was Foreign Orientals, which included the Chinese, Arabs, Indians and Japanese
who were born in the Dutch East Indies or had resided there for 10 years or above. The
bottom level was the indigenous population (Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 83; Shiraishi & Shiraishi,
1993, p. 8). According to The Siauw Giap (1967, p. 91), it was this stratification which made
Islam less attractive to the Chinese, because Muslims were considered indigenous people
with a status inferior to that of the Chinese.
Under Dutch rule, Chinese businesspeople became indispensable to the colonial
economy. The colonial government granted Chinese licenses to engage in "the selling of
opium, the operation of gambling establishments, ferries, pawnshops, and abattoirs, and the
gathering of birds' nests for export to the gourmets of China" (Williams, 1960, p. 24). Such a
monopoly concession system was known as revenue or tax farming and the license holder
was known as a revenue farmer (Govaars, 2005, p. 27; Williams, 1960, p. 25). Among all
monopoly concessions the opium concession was the most lucrative (Govaars, 2005, p. 28).2
The monopoly concession system produced many wealthy Chinese revenue farmers.
In order to prevent the Chinese and the indigenous people from combining forces to
challenge them, the Dutch introduced zoning and pass systems in 1835 and 1863,
respectively, that required the Chinese to reside in restricted areas and prevented them from
2 For the history of the opium revenue farming system in the Dutch East Indies, especially in Java, see Rush
(2007).
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travelling out of these areas unless they had passes (Suryadinata, 1993b, pp. 81-82). These
systems effectively prevented the Chinese fromliving 'among the indigenous population and
restricted interaction between the Chinese and other ethnic groups. Moreover, according to
Leo Suryadinata, the zoning system "had a far-reaching impact on the 'separateness' of the
Chinese" (Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 82). The Chinese therefore began to occupy an ambivalent
position in Indonesian society during Dutch rule. On the one hand, they played a crucial role
in the colony's economic development. On the other hand, the Chinese began to be perceived
as the "Other" because of this and were increasingly regarded with suspicion and prejudice
by the indigenous majority.
In the 1890's Dutch humanitarians pressured the Dutch colonial government to
abolish the revenue farming system, since they saw it as detrimental to the welfare of the
indigenous population (Williams, 1960, pp. 25-27). This move broke part of the Chinese
economic power. The Chinese in Indonesia were also further angered when, in 1899, after the
defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Dutch government acceded
to the Japanese government request to classify the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies as
Europeans (Fasseur, 1994, p. 37). Although the Chinese also demanded equal status with
Europeans, the Dutch rejected this demand as the colonial government was concerned that the
concession would exert a considerable impact on the growing nationalist forces among
indigenous Indonesians.' As Mona Lohanda (1996) notes:
Considering the turbulent political circumstances of the colony, particularly
from the first decade of the twentieth century, the Dutch were very cautious in
their handling of Chinese affairs. Yielding to the Chinese request for equal
3 For the origins of the nationalist movement among indigenous Indonesians in the early twentieth century and
its relationship with the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies, see Lohanda (2002, pp. 171-205) and Shiraishi
(1997).
6
status would provoke anti-Chinese feeling among the Indonesians, which in
turn might endanger the Dutch themselves.
(p. 151)
At the same time, political events in China stimulated the nationalist sentiments of the
Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. China had been invaded by foreign powers in the
nineteenth century, losing in the Opium War (1840-1842) to the British and suffering an
immense defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). After the Boxer Uprising in
1900, Beijing was invaded and plundered by the allied armies, an alliance of the armies of
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the
United States (US) (Govaars, 2005, p. 49).4As Ming Govaars (2005) remarks, "The division
of China into foreign concessions and spheres of influence threatened to make it 'a kind of
international colony'" (p. 49). Two prominent Chinese political leaders, K'ang Yu-wei (Jlif
79) and Sun Yat-sen (f!J\~1w/*J\9=t LiJ), sought to rescue China "while living in exile among
the overseas Chinese" (Govaars, 2005, p. 49). K'ang was a reformist while Sun was a
revolutionary. The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies, who had suffered great loss of prestige,
could identify with the difficulties of China and offered financial support to both K'ang and
Sun with the hope to "contribute to the future greatness of their ancient homeland" (Govaars,
2005, p. 49). In addition, the lifting of the prohibition of Chinese emigration by the Manchu
government (Qing Dynasty) in 1894 and the issuance of the Chinese law of nationality in
1909 which was based on jus sanguinis and claimed that every legal or extra-legal child of
Chinese father or mother would be considered a Chinese citizen, regardless of birthplace
4 The Boxer Uprising was an anti-foreigner movement that took place in China in 1900. For the origins and
background of the uprising, see Esherick (1987).
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further strengthened the nationalist sentiments of the Chinese in the Indonesian archipelago
(Govaars, 2005, p. 50; Willmott, 1961, p. 14).5
These various factors contributed to the Pan-Chinese Movement in the Dutch East
Indies, which revolted against the restrictions placed on the Chinese, particularly the zoning
and pass systems. 'Pan-Chinese Movement' is a term used by scholars such as Lea E.
Williams (1960), Leo Suryadinata (1981) and Ming Govaars (2005) to refer to the emergence
of nationalist sentiments oriented toward China and the revival of Chinese culture among the
peranakan Chinese in early twentieth century Dutch East Indies. The peranakan Chinese
tried to preserve their Chinese identity and safeguard their business as well as political
interests by forming various Chinese organisations. These included the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan
(TIllIK), a Chinese organisation which promoted Chinese nationalism based on the teachings
of Confucius through the Chinese-medium schools set up by the organisation in the Indies;
the Siang Hwee (Chinese Chamber of Commerce) that championed the interests of Chinese
business and community; and the Soe Po Sia (Chinese reading club) which disseminated
modem political ideas through the distribution of reading materials (Williams, 1960, pp. 54-
113; Kwee, 1969, pp. 1-21; Govaars, 2005, pp. 58-61; Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 5-6). The
peranakan Chinese also established newspapers in Bahasa Melajoe Tionghoa (Sino-Malay
language) such as Li Po, Chabar PerniagaardPerniagaan, Pewarta Soerabaia, Djawa
Tengah and Sin Po to promote Chinese nationalism and Chinese culture (Suryadinata, 1981,
pp. 5-6, 21).6 In order to curb Chinese nationalism, and placate the Pan-Chinese movement,
the colonial government passed a nationality law in 1910 based on jus soli which declared
that all persons born in the Indies of parents residing there were Dutch subjects even if not
Dutch citizens (Willmott, 1961, p. 15). Thus, the Indies-born Chinese were both Chinese
5 Previously, the Manchu government prohibited the emigration of Chinese and those returning to China from
abroad were subjected to death penalty. For more details on this policy, see Lim (1967, p. 63) and Chong
(1983/84, p. 3).
6 Sin Po later published its Chinese-language edition, known asXin Bao, in 1921 (Suryadinata, 1997, p. 254).
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citizens and Dutch subjects," Later in 1917 and 1918, the Dutch abolished the hated zoning
and pass systems (Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 10-11).
Takashi Shiraishi (1997, pp. 187-207), however, argues that these systems restricting
Chinese movement and residence were abolished because the Dutch saw that anti-Sinicism
was already firmly in place among indigenous Indonesians in the early 1910s as a result of
the rise of new nationalist politics that emphasised racial distinctions. Hence, it was no longer
necessary to require Chinese and indigenous people to reside in different quarters. In fact, the
abolishment of both systems in the late 1910s did not bring significant improvement in
interactions and relations between the Chinese and the indigenous population. Many pribumi
(indigenous people) perceived the Chinese as foreigners who were culturally different from
the indigenous population.! They also believed that the Chinese were economically strong but
exclusive and selfish (Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 78; Coppel, 1983, p. 5).
It should be noted that the political orientation of the Chinese was never
homogeneous. Apart from the pro-China Chinese, there were also pro-Dutch and pro-
Indonesian Chinese during the Dutch colonial period. The pro-Dutch Chinese were
represented by Chung Hwa Hui (CHH), a Chinese organisation founded by wealthy Chinese
businessmen while the pro-Indonesian Chinese were represented by the Indonesian Chinese
Party (PTI- Partai Tionghoa Indonesia), a Chinese political party that supported the
Indonesian natiorialist movement. Nevertheless, PTI was never a strong party as it was not
supported by wealthy Chinese businessmen who were mostly pro-Dutch. The party was also
7 This foreshadowed the emergence of the Chinese dual citizenship status as a political issue in post-colonial
Indonesia.
8 It should be noted that the indigenous population also differed in terms of ethnicity and religious backgrounds.
Apart from Javanese, the largest indigenous ethnic group in Indonesia, there are other indigenous ethnic groups
such as Sundanese, Madurese, Bugis, etc. Although the majority of the indigenous population are Muslims,
there are also indigenous Indonesians who are non-Muslims. For instance, most of the indigenous people in
North Sulawesi are Protestant Christians. In Bali, the indigenous people are predominantly Hindus.
9
not regarded as an Indonesian party by the Indonesian nationalist movement (Suryadinata,
1981).9
In addition, the Dutch allowed the Chinese to establish Chinese-language newspapers.
Most of such newspapers were managed by totok Chinese, i.e. pure-blood Chinese who were
born in China and migrated to the Indies (Huang, 2005, p. 390). In fact, it can be said that the
Dutch allowed the Chinese to form ethnic-based organisations, establish Chinese-language
presses and open Chinese-medium schools because they wanted the Chinese to maintain their
"Chinese-ness" in order to keep them as a distinct ethnic group and prevent them from
mingling with the indigenous population.
The loyalty of the Chinese to the Indies was also doubted by many pribumi. Before
independence, the Chinese were often suspected of allying with the Dutch and China (Dawis,
2009, p. 2). Such stereotypes and prejudice manifested in anti-Chinese violence that broke
out in Tangerang, Jakarta, Bandung, Pontianak, Palembang, Bagan Siapi-Api and Medan
during the early phase of the Revolution (1945-1946) (Somers, 1965, pp. 110-119; Heidhues,
1974, pp. 101-102, 109; Cribb, 1991, pp. 53; 111). Many Chinese traders were attacked
because they were deemed as rivals of indigenous small businesses. Some Chinese were
caught in the riots because they were suspected of being in league with the Dutch (Heidhues,
1974, p. 109; Hoon, 2008, 33).
The Sukarno Years (1950-1965)
After independence, some indigenous leaders assumed that the Chinese were oriented
to China instead of Indonesia (Dawis, 2009, p. 2). Many Chinese in Indonesia, especially
those who were recent immigrants, had a strong sense of pride in China (Coppel, 1983, p.
26). The victory of the communists in China in 1949 triggered Chinese nationalism among
9 For more details on the origins and development ofCHH and PTl, see Suryadinata (1981, pp. 39-84).
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Chinese Indonesians and prompted some Chinese Indonesians to return to China to receive
further Chinese-language education and to build their ancestral land (Godley, 1989; Hui,
2011, pp. 98-99). In the eyes of some indigenous Indonesian leaders, the Chinese minority
was oriented toward China, They therefore perceived the Chinese minority as a potential
'fifth column' for China (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 167).10They were therefore uncomfortable
with the dual citizenship of the Chinese that emerged again out of the relatively liberal the
Citizenship Act of 1946 and the Round Table Agreement on Citizenship in 1949 between
Indonesia and the Netherlands. Under these provisions, those Chinese who had been Dutch
subjects and did not reject Indonesian citizenship were considered as citizens of both
Indonesia and China (Hoon, 2008, p. 33). For many indigenous nationalists, as Hoon Chang-
Yau (2008) puts it, "dual nationality meant that the political loyalty of the Chinese must be
divided between Indonesia and China" (p. 34). Moreover, during the 1955 Bandung Asian-
African Conference, China abandoned its traditional claim that all ethnic Chinese were
Chinese citizens (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 171). Both President Sukarno and the Chinese prime
minister, Zhou Enlai (.mJ J~t*),agreed that ethnic Chinese should choose only one citizenship
(Liu, 2011, pp. 177-179). Hence, in 1958, a new and less liberal citizenship act known as
"Act No. 62 of the year 1958 Concerning Republic of Indonesia Citizenship" was passed
(Willmott, 1961, p. 118). Under the new act, Chinese in Indonesia would lose their
citizenship if they did not submit an official statement abjuring Chinese citizenship
(Willmott, 1961, p. 120; Hoon, 2008, p. 34). However, the act was only fully implemented in
1960, thus leaving the citizenship of most Chinese in an ambiguous state between 1958 and
1960 (Hoon, 2008, p. 35). In November 1959, as part of the steps towards reducing the
economic role of ethnic Chinese, the government issued the Presidential Decree No. 10 that
banned "alien" (i.e. Chinese) retail trade in rural areas and required all the aliens to transfer
10 According to Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d.), the expression 'fifth column' refers to a "clandestine group or
faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation's solidarity by any means at their disposal".
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their business to Indonesian citizens by January 1, 1960 (Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina=
BAKIN, 1979, pp. 301-305). Although the decree was officially only directed at Chinese
without Indonesian citizenship, in reality, those with Indonesian citizenship encountered
similar distress as the distinction between citizens and aliens was still unclear (Hoon, 2008, p.
35). In West Java alone, 9,927 Chinese were forced to move from rural areas to urban places
(Huang, 2000, p. 19). There were also Chinese who were sent back to China. According to..
Thee Kian Wie (2006, p. 88), around 119,000 Chinese citizens were repatriated to China
during 1960-1961. Some chose to leave for China because they thought that the Presidential
Decree had threatened their livelihood (Mackie, 1976, p. 95).
Earlier in April 1950, the Sukarno government implemented the "Benteng" (Fortress)
programme which gave priority to indigenous businesspeople to engage in import-export
business and prohibited the Chinese from getting involved in such business (Thee, 2006, p.
80). However, instead of fostering a strong and self-reliant indigenous business class, the
programme "resulted in the emergence of the 'Ali Baba' system in which Chinese
Indonesians used indigenous Indonesians as 'front men' or 'sleeping partners'" (Lembong,
2008, p. 50). The programme eventually came to an end in the second half of the 1950s
(Thee, 2006, p. 84).
Although the Sukarno government introduced the above discriminatory policy to
reduce Chinese economic interests and assist indigenous businesspeople, it allowed ethnic
Chinese to form ethnic-based organisations (ranging from cultural associations to clan groups
to business chambers), establish Chinese-language presses, open Chinese-medium schools,
and be involved in politics (Pandiangan, 2003, pp. 410-412; Suryadinata, 1992, pp. 149-153;
1993, 86-88; 1997, pp. 253-259). In fact, in the new parliament elected in the 1955 election,
which was the first national election held in Indonesia after independence, nine appointed
seats were reserved for ethnic Chinese (Heidhues, 1974, p. 77). There were even a few
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cabinet ministers who were of Chinese origin (Suryadinata., 1992, pp. 14, n10, 14, n l l ;
1993b, p. 88). The government allowed the Chinese to keep their ethnic and cultural
identities because Sukarno was close to China and hence was relatively tolerant to the
Chinese in Indonesia.
It is important to note that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are by no means culturally
homogenous. Conventionally, scholars have divided them into peranakan and totok. The
peranakan were local-born and acculturated Chinese. Some of them were products of
intermarriage between Chinese male immigrants and local indigenous women. They had been
residing in Indonesia for centuries. Although the peranakan still identified themselves as
Chinese, they had adopted many elements of the majority Indonesian indigenous culture and
some of them could not speak Chinese (Skinner, 1958, p. 2; Somers, 1964, p. 4; Hoon, 2008,
pp. 4-5). As mentioned earlier in this article, the totok, on the other hand, were pure-blood
Chinese who were born in China and migrated to the Indies. They spoke Chinese and
maintained most Chinese customs and cultural traditions. In addition, they were generally
more politically oriented to China. According to Leo Suryadinata (1992, p. 90), the
peranakan also used the Hokkien term 'singkeh', meaning 'new guests', to refer to the totok.
Mass Chinese immigration to the Indies took place in the second half of the nineteenth
century. The mass immigration was a result of the Taiping Rebellion, a civil war against the
Manchu imperial government which began in Guangxi in 1850 and later spread to other
provinces. I I The immigrants included a significant number of women and it became possible
for Chinese men to marry China-born women rather than indigenous or peranakan women.F
11 For the origins and background of the Taping Rebellion, see Jen (1973).
12 Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, there was no female emigration from China to Southeast
Asia. This was due to a few factors. First, although the Manchu imperial government officially prohibited the
emigration of Chinese, in reality, the regulation was often strictly enforced over the women but not the men.
This was because the officials knew that the male emigrants often returned with their savings or had to send
money to their families in China, thus allowing the officials to extort money from them. Second, women were
accorded very low social status in the traditional Chinese society. The main duty of women was to remain at
home to look after their children and parents-in-law. Therefore, they were forced to remain in China. In fact, this
special role of Chinese women was manifested in the custom of foot-binding, which forced women to stay
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Many more Chinese women immigrated to Indonesia after 1900 as a result of the Boxer
Uprising in 1900 mentioned earlier in this chapter. Descendants of these new immigrants
usually remained culturally totok Chinese and formed the distinct and separate totok
community (Somers, 1964, p. 4; Hoon, 2008, p. 5).
In post-colonial Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese peranakan
community was dividedfnto two competing streams. The 'integrationist' group led by the- .
Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship (BAPERKI- Badan Permusjawaratan
Kewarganegaraan Indonesia) fought for citizenship rights for ethnic Chinese and advocated
for recognition of a separate Chinese ethnic identity yet one remaining part of the Indonesian
nation. This group believed Chinese Indonesians did not need to give up their cultural
heritage to fully participate in national politics (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 33; Aizawa, 2011, pp.
49-50; Hoon, 2008, p. 35). BAPERKI was founded in March 1954 with the aim to promote
the understanding of Indonesian citizenship and the elimination of discrimination against
ethnic Chinese who were Indonesian citizens (Coppel, 1976, pp. 45-46; Somers, 1964, p. 11;
Hoon, 2008, p. 35). On the other hand, the 'assimilationists' group formed by a number of
Chinese peranakan, who were Christians or right wing elements associated with the military,
advocated the complete assimilation of the Chinese into the indigenous Indonesian
indoors. Third, most of the male emigrants were too poor to bring their families overseas (Lim, 1967, pp. 63-64;
Chong, 1983/84, pp. 3-4). Chinese female immigration to Southeast Asia began only from the latter half of the
nineteenth century as some of the hindrances that had earlier prevented them from leaving the country were
removed. The immediate factor that prompted Chinese female emigration was the economic and political
upheavals in China brought about by the Taiping Rebellion. The chaotic situation in China forced many Chinese
women to migrate overseas. Besides that, the contact the Chinese had with the West, as a consequence of the
Opium and Arrow Wars in nineteenth century China, played an essential role in eliminating the traditional
prejudice the Chinese had against female emigration (For the origins and background of the Opium and Arrow
Wars, see Elleman [2001, pp. 3-56]). The opening of the ''treaty-ports'' in Guangdong and Fujian brought to the
increase in the interaction of the Chinese in these two provinces with Europeans. This interaction had resulted in
the establishment of several girls' schools by European Christian missionaries. Both Christian and non-Christian
female students attended these schools. Apart from their educational work, the Christian missionaries also
joined certain Chinese women to fight against the foot-binding custom that discriminated against women. Such
efforts had contributed to educational and social advancement of Chinese women, thus removing the traditional
prejudice among Chinese against female emigration. Furthermore, in 1860, the Manchu government officially
allowed Chinese women to emigrate as wives and dependents of the male emigrants. These factors prompted
female emigration from China in the second half of the nineteenth century (Lim, 1967, pp. 72-75; Chong,
1983/84, pp. 5-6).
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population (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 70; Hoon, 2008, pp. 35-36). According to Suryadinata
(1992, pp. 70-72), these assimilationists Chinese peranakan included Junus Jahja a.k.a. Lauw
Chuan Tho (~u-1:i!t), an economist; Ong Hok Ham a.k.a. Onghokham (.:Emm~l), a university
student; and K. Sindhunatha (.:E*#lI:), a navy captain. The assimilationists were of the
opinion that the Chinese needed. to "abandon their cultural background and exclusionary
lifestyle - that is, living separately from other Indonesian ethnic groups" in order to eliminate
discrimination against them (Aizawa, 2011, p. 49).
The Suharto Years (1966-1998)
The anti-Communist violence associated with the Cold War instigated by the Suharto-
led military after the military takeover on October 1, 1965 took a strong anti-Chinese tum at
times from 1965 to 1968 (Mackie, 1976; Davidson, 2009b, pp. 47-84; Hui, 2011, pp. 115-
146; Tsai & Kammen, 2012).13 Many Chinese in Indonesia were accused of being
Communist sympathisers and at least two thousand of them were killed from 1965 to 1966
(Coppel, 1983, p. 58). The last and worst major anti-Chinese violence broke out at late 1967
and early 1968 in West Kalimantan. The military provoked Dayaks to murder Chinese who
were accused of supporting the communist party (Mackie, 1976, pp. 126-128; Davidson,
2009b, pp. 47-84; Hui, 2011, pp. 115-146). About two to five thousand Chinese were killed
and nearly 100,000 Chinese were relocated to coastal cities and towns such as Pontianak and
Singkawang (Davidson, 2009b, pp. 68, 74-77).14
13 For a comprehensive discussion on the background of the military takeover and the subsequent mass violence
against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI- Partai Komunis Indonesia) and the Left, see Kammen and
McGregor (2012).
14 It should be noted that the anti-Communist violence was never anti-Chinese massacres in general, although
the massacres that broke out in West Kalimantan in 1967 and 1968 was targeted exclusively at Chinese (see
Davidson [2009b, pp. 47-84J for more details on massacres of Chinese in West Kalimantan). There were about
half a million people killed in 1965-1966 and the victims were mostly indigenous Indonesians who were
members and associates of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKl). Relatively few Chinese were murdered in
this period (Cribb & Coppel, 2009, pp, 447-465; Tsai & Kammen, 2012, pp. 131-155). Prior to its collapse in
1965, the PKl was relatively tolerant of the Chinese minority due to the "anti-racist character of Marxist
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Later, Suharto's government began to enforce assimilation policies to curtail Chinese
culture and control the ethnic Chinese. Public displays of Chinese characters were forbidden.
Ethnic Chinese were not allowed to openly celebrate Chinese holidays or festivals. Ethnic
Chinese organisations were banned except those dealing with health, religion, burial services,
sports and recreation.P Schools that offered all instruction in Chinese were closed down.
Chinese-language newsp~pers were prohibited, except for one produced by the government.
Furthermore, ethnic Chinese were urged to adopt indigenous-sounding names (Coppel, 1983,
p. 165; 2002, pp. 22-23; Suryadinata, 1992, pp. 153-164; Chua, 2008, pp. 39-40).
It is worth noting that although many Chinese in Indonesia became more
Peranakanised, if not 'Indonesianised', under Suharto's policy of forced assimilation, in
some places like Medan, Pontianak, Singkawang, Bangka and Belitung, the local Chinese
generally can still speak Mandarin and certain Chinese dialects. Many older Chinese can read
and write Chinese as they had studied in pre-New Order Chinese-medium schools. The
younger generation generally cannot read and write Chinese but they can still speak
Mandarin and certain Chinese dialects. Moreover, many Chinese in those places also still
practise most Chinese customs as well as cultural traditions."
During the New Order period, Suharto's regime also issued regulations and decrees
that marginalised and stigmatised the Chinese. For instance, a particular code was attached to
the national identity cards and passports of Indonesians of Chinese origin (Tan, 1991, p. 123;
Aizawa, 2011, pp. 60-61). This coding system stigmatised the Chinese and "constantly
exposed them -to discrimination and exploitation by the bureaucracy, police and military"
(Hoon, 2008, p. 39). Chinese Indonesians also had to produce a Citizenship Letter (SBKRI-
ideology" (McVey, 1968, p. 359). The party leaders often stood out against racial attacks on the Chinese
minority (Mackie, 1976, p. 79).
15 Some Chinese organisations therefore converted to charitable foundations (yayasan) that focused on health,
religion, burial services, sports or recreation in order to continue to operate.
16 In fact, a lecturer at the University of Indonesia once told me that many people in Jakarta deemed Chinese
Indonesians from 'PBBM' (Pontianak, Bangka, Belitung and Medan) as less assimilated and exclusive (personal
communication with Timothy (pseudonym), in Indonesian, January 31, 2011).
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Sural Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia) to obtain documents such as birth
certificates, passports or marriage certificates (Aizawa, 2011, p. 61). In addition, as
mentioned earlier in this article, unwritten barriers restricted the Chinese from politics, public
service, military and entrance to public universities. During the New Order era, there were,
very few ethnic Chinese members of parliament.!? These were Chinese peranakan from the
'assimilationists' group." As Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (1990) notes, "In another sort of
regime, men of their [i.e. the very few ethnic Chinese members of parliament in New Order
Indonesia] abilities would probably long since have achieved cabinet rank:" (p. 115, n52). In
general, the Chinese were only given the right to participate in economic activities (Chua,
2008, p. 42). As a result, as Hoon Chang- Yau (2006b) notes, "This continuous and
intentional official discrimination against the Chinese placed them in a vulnerable position of
ethnic and class hostility" (p. 153).
So why did Suharto's New Order issue regulations and decrees that contradicted the
assimilation policies? In his study of the background of the assimilation policies, Nobuhiro
Aizawa (2011) suggests a possible reason. According to Aizawa (2011, p. 60), the Ministry
of Home Affairs (DEPDAGRI- Departemen Dalam Negeriy which drafted and issued the
assimilation policies, considered assimilation as a way "to prevent possible sources of
political opposition and, thus, pave the way for the president's re-election". Therefore, the
Chinese, who continued to be perceived as a potential 'fifth column' of China, needed to be
17 A few months before the collapse of the New Order regime, Suharto appointed Bob Hasan a.k.a. The Kian
Seng (1$ ~ ~), his long-time crony and golf partner of Chinese descent minister of trade and industry
(Setyautama, 2008, p. 410). But Hasan was adopted by an indigenous Muslim military officer since he was little
and had been highly assimilated into indigenous society. Hence, as Li Zhuo Hui (*.$~) (2007, p. 153), chief
editor of Indonesian Chinese-language press Guo Ji Ri Bao ( «00 I$.F B tin )points out, the Chinese community
did not perceive Hasan as an "ethnic Chinese businessperson" and did not think he represented the Chinese
community.
18 They included Sofyan Wanandi a.k.a, Liem Bian Khoen (;Mzm:!:$) (representing the university student group),
Jusuf Wanandi a.k.a. Liem Bien Kie (;Mzm~) (Golkar), L. B. G. Surjadinata a.k.a. Lie Beng Giok (Indonesian
Protestant Party), Lo S. H. Ginting (Catholic Party), Harry Tjan Silalahi a.k.a. Tjan Tjoen Hok (lf~m;)
(Catholic Party), Budi Dipojuwono a.k.a. Lie Po Yoe (*f::Fdti) (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and Djoko
Sudjatmiko a.k.a Lie Giok Houw (*~JjC) (Golkar) (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 14n12; Suryadinata, 1993, p. 88;
Setyautama, 2008, pp. 170, 182, 193,433,434).
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de-politicised to ensure that the government took better control of any political threat or
opposition (Aizawa, 2011, pp. 60-61). 19 Chua makes a similar argument that such
contradictions were meant to ensure that the social and political status of the Chinese, who
were economically significant, remained politically weak. Under such circumstances, the
Chinese would not be able to challenge the position of the power-holders. This would then
secure the social and f~ancial base of the politico-bureaucratic rulers' power (Chua, 2008,
pp. 37-38, 41-43). In other words, the assimilation policies were aimed to secure the power of
Suharto's regime and were never meant to integrate the Chinese into the general Indonesian
population.
The New Order policy, therefore, deliberately excluded the ethnic Chinese from
politics, and thus many Chinese, as had been the case over the centuries, chose to get
involved in economic activities. The New Order also saw the emergence of a substantial
number of cukongs, Chinese Indonesian capitalists who collaborated with members of the
Indonesian power elite, usually from the military and the Suharto family, both of these being
the dominant political force during the Suharto era. These cukongs included Liem Sioe Liong
a.k.a. Sudono Salim (f*ffl ~), Tjia Kian Liong a.k.a. William Soerjadjaja (~H!Ii:)and Lie
Mo Tie a.k.a. Mochtar Riady (,$)(iE). They were all owners of conglomerates (big business
groups). The Suharto regime provided protection and various facilities such as privileged
access to licenses, contracts and state bank credit to these cukongs. In return, the power elite
and their family became the Chinese capitalists' business partners (Robison, 1986, pp. 271-
322; Suryadinata, 1997, pp. 33-34). Many cukongs channelled part of their profits to their
political patrons' foundations (yayasan) in the form of 'donations' (Chua, 2008, p. 49).
However, as Suryadinata has maintained, the number of such cukongs was small and did not
19 To further control possible sources of political opposition, Suharto's regime even reduced the number of
political parties to three in 1973, i.e. Golkar that was set up by the Suharto group, United Development Parties
(PPP_ Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia)
(Suryadinata, 2002a, pp. 30-31).
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represent Chinese Indonesians in general (Suryadinata, 2002b, p. 15). Most of the Chinese in
Indonesia were, and still are, owner-managers of small- and medium-scale enterprises or
professionals. Nevertheless, the corrupt relationships between a handful of Chinese
Indonesian tycoons and power elites greatly influenced indigenous Indonesians' perception of
the Chinese. As a result, Chinese Indonesians were (and are) generally perceived to be
wealthier than indigenous Indonesians, corrupt and opportunistic. I argue that Chinese
Indonesian tycoons during the New Order had played a crucial role in reinforcing the
negative stereotypes against ethnic Chinese.
By confming the Chinese to the economic sector and forming an alliance with a
handful of well-connected Chinese tycoons, the New Order regime managed to fortify the
perception of the Chinese as economically powerful and responsible for social and economic
inequalities in the country. The Chinese had no means to rectify this impression since they
were socially and politically weak. Christian Chua (2008) has noted that
[the Chinese] were at the regime's mercy and had to put up with these kinds of
stigmatisation that were meant to instrumentalise them as scapegoats in
several ways. [... ] [T]hey were blamed for the misery of the pribumi. The
discontent of the powerless masses and the anger about their economic
situation could be diverted from the rulers towards the Chinese minority.
(p.44)
Consequently, the Chinese were exposed to periodic anti-Chinese riots during economic
crises (e.g. in 1997-1998) and workers' strikes (e.g. the workers' strike in Medan that took
place in 1994) (Purdey, 2006, pp, 77-141; Yang, 2006, 2007; Chua, 2008, p. 44).20Even
20 For the background of the workers' strike in Medan, see Yang (2006, pp. 241-242).
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minor incidents such as traffic accidents, street fights and employer-worker disputes
involving Chinese and pribumi could turn into anti-Chinese riots (Dahana, 2004, pp. 48-49).
In addition, as John T. Sidel (2006) observes, the anxiety of Muslims about the ambiguous
political position of Islam in New Order Indonesia also led to attacks on the Chinese. The
ambiguous political position of Islam had its origins in the colonial period, whereby the
Dutch colonial government prioritised Indonesian Christians graduated from missionary
schools in the recruitment of civil servants, teachers and army officers, as well as granted
economic privileges to the Chiriese minority. As a result, Muslims became subordinate in
Indonesia. These conditions persisted even after independence. Although Muslims were the
majority in Indonesia, they were unable to hold a dominant position in the political arena.
Sidel points out that in post-colonial Indonesia, key posts in the bureaucracy and the military
were held by those educated in secular and Christian schools, and not those with Islamic
educational backgrounds. Moreover, there was no organisation that could be considered to
represent the voice of all Muslims in the country. Muslim organisations like All-Indonesian
Association of Islamic Intellectuals (lCMI- Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia),
which was founded by Suharto's close associate B. 1. Habibie in the early 1990s, only spoke
for middle-class Muslim professionals, while Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was an organisation that
represented only rural Muslims. Moreover, while the New Order era saw the rise of Chinese
conglomerates, local indigenous small business communities were at the same time
undermined and marginalised due to the lack of access to capital and technology, as well as
the lack in established connections with the state. The anxiety and feelings of inferiority
among Muslims prompted them to spread violence against the mostly non-Muslim Chinese,
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across the country." As Jemma Purdey (2005) puts it, "Incidents of violence against the
Chinese took place frequently and signified a disturbing trend" (p. 14).22
In summary it can be said that the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies and in the
Republic of Indonesia after independence were treated as a "pariah class" (Riggs, 1964,
1966; Chua, 2008), powerful in business, but hated for their wealth. They came to be
perceived as the "Other" by the indigenous Indonesians. To borrow Fredrik Barth's term
(1969, p. 15), the Chinese and the pribumi came to be separated by an ethnic boundary, that
is a social boundary that emerges if an ethnic group maintains its identity when its members
interact with outsiders (Barth, 1969, p. 15). Even though the cultural characteristics within an
ethnic group may change and transform, as long as the dichotomisation between members
and outsiders persists, the ethnic group will continue to exist (Barth, 1969, p. 14). It can be
said that although the Chinese and the pribumi generally became culturally more similar
under Suharto' s forced assimilation, the boundary that separated them was strengthened at
the same time. As a result, the Chinese continued to occupy an ambiguous, outsider position
in Indonesian society. As Hui Yew-Foong (2011) explains, "[T]he Chinese are strangers in
Indonesian society" (p. 15). According to Simmel (1950), the "stranger" is a person "who
comes today and stays tomorrow" (p. 402). He or she is not an 'owner of soil' since he or she
is deemed as a stranger by the other (Simmel, 1950, p. 403).
Post-Subarto Era 11998-Present)
Suharto's authoritarian rule ended in 1998 amid the Asian financial crisis
(Suryadinata, 2001, p. 506). Social unrest in Indonesia, aggravated by the fmancial crisis,
escalated and peaked in mid-May in Jakarta, Solo and other parts of the country. Chinese
21 It should be noted that these attacks were fundamentally religious and not ethnic in nature.
22 However, it should be pointed out that during the New Order period, the real upswing of anti-Chinese
violence only took place between 1995 and 1998. Violence against the Chinese was fairly minimal prior to that.
For an account of violence against the Chinese during the New Order era, see Coppel (1983); Mackie (1976, pp.
111-138); Purdey (2006); Yang (2006; 2007).
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shops and properties were looted and burned down, and as mentioned earlier, it was alleged
that many Chinese women were brutally tortured, raped and murdered (Mackie, 1999, p.
189).23According to the Joint Fact-Finding Team (Joint Team) appointed by the Habibie
government to investigate the riots, the violence was probably instigated by someone "at the
country's 'highest levels' of decision-making" to create a critical upheaval so that martial law
could be imposed (The Joint Fact-Finding Team [TGPF], n.d.). Leo Suryadinata (2001, p.
507) suggests another possible scenario that the violence was an outcome of the internal
conflict within the military.i" It has also been argued that the violence was instigated by the
military to deflect public anger from the Suharto regime and towards the Chinese minority
(Heryanto, 1999, p. 327). However, to date there is still no concrete evidence available and
therefore it is difficult to prove such involvement conclusively.
The fall of Suharto in May 1998 has led to a process of democratisation in Indonesia,
with the implementation of a few significant institutional reforms. The period of reform and
democratisation after the end of the authoritarian regime was also marked by a considerable
decline in anti-Chinese violence after May 1998. John Sidel (2006) attributes the decline of
anti-Chinese riots to state-dependent Muslim elites' engagement in straight religious
competition, instead of using anti-Chinese violence to assume more political power. Jacques
Bertrand, on the other hand, offers a more comprehensive explanation on the significant
decline of anti-Chinese violence. He notes that the killings of May 1998, particularly the
alleged mass rape cases, as well as the alleged involvement of the armed forces in the riots,
shocked the political elite and Islamic politicians who had been most critical and vocal about
Suharto's collusion with Chinese Indonesian big business groups. They began to sympathise
23 However, as Hoon (2008) stated in his published dissertation, the rapes are still "a contested issue as there has
been no consensus on the number of rape victims" and ''there is still a general denial of the rapes in Indonesia's
official discourse" (p. 46).
24 Suryadinata (2001, p. 507) points to the power struggle between General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-
law, and General Wiranto, Suharto appointee. According to this analysis, Prabowo instigated the violence to
discredit Wiranto, who was the then Commander of the Armed forces, so that he could seize power from the
latter.
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with the Chinese minority and acknowledge that the Chinese had not been treated justly.
Sarah Turner (2003) makes a similar remark, "Since 1998 there has been an increased official
and general acknowledgement within Indonesia that the ethnic Chinese community received
gross injustices during the period of the riots" (p. 347).
The reversal of attitudes toward the Chinese was also catalysed by capital flight and
the 'exodus' of Chinese after the events of May 1998. In addition, some Chinese Indonesian
tycoons had cooperated with post-New Order governments in investigations about corruption
and this contributed further to the easing of the resentment against the Chinese. Bertrand
(2004) also notes that the prosecution and subsequent imprisonment of Bob Hasan (~IHt~),
Suharto's long-time crony and golf partner of Chinese descent, "particularly pleased many
Indonesians" (p. 69). In other words, the endofSuharto's regime had removed Hasan, one of
the most significant symbols of hostility against the Chinese minority.
Under the influence of a more sympathetic view from Indonesian political elites,
Chinese Indonesians have begun to benefit from reforms introduced by subsequent
governments. Many discriminatory measures against the Chinese were removed. Most
significantly, Suharto's policy of forced assimilation was abandoned. In 2001, President
Abdurrahman Wahid sanctioned the publication of Chinese-language print media through the
repealing of laws that had prohibited the local publication of Chinese characters in Indonesia
since 1965 and thus Chinese language materials became more freely available. Many schools
were allowed to conduct Chinese language courses.P Besides that, ethnic Chinese were
allowed to openly celebrate Chinese festivals (Hoon, 2008, p. 104; Giblin, 2003, pp. 347-
348). In fact, in 2002, President Megawati Sukarnoputri announced that the Chinese New
year would be a state holiday from 2003 (Freedman, 2003, p. 447). In July 2006, under Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency, the Indonesian Parliament passed a landmark bill on
25 However, Chinese-medium schools have not been re-opened (Lembong, 2008, p. 54).
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citizenship which took a step toward ending discrimination against ethnic Chinese
Indonesians. The law did away with the distinction between 'indigenous' and 'non-
indigenous' Indonesians - long cited by Chinese Indonesians as discrimination- by
redefining 'indigenous Indonesian' to include all people born in Indonesia and/or to
Indonesian parents, and who have never assumed foreign citizenship. Under the new law,
Chinese Indonesians wiq no longer need to produce proof of their citizenship or undergo the
naturalisation process as long as they were born to parents who are Indonesian citizens
(Asmarani, 2006, p. 1). They are also allowed to hold government posts, including the
presidency, that were formerly closed to them. Therefore, it can be said that the reversal of
attitudes toward the Chinese was also due to the rise of political leaders who were open-
minded and sympathetic to the situation of the Chinese.
Hence, the fall of Suharto in May 1998 was a turning point for the Chinese in
Indonesia to openly and actively participate in the socio-political arena. A few Chinese have
also made use of the democratic environment to participate in national as well as local
politics and establish ethnic Chinese social and cultural organisations. Most ethnic Chinese
organisations that were established or re-emerged in the post-1998 period were Chinese clan
organisations and alumni associations of pre-1965 Chinese-medium schools in Indonesia.
Since the end of Suharto's rule, many Chinese organisations that were previously closed
down re-emerged and those that had been converted to foundations dealing with health,
religion, burial services, sports or recreation began to include again socio-cultural activities
that openly celebrate and promote Chinese traditions and culture in their routine activities.
Two major ethnic Chinese mass organisations in post-Suharto Indonesia, i.e. the Indonesian
Chinese Social Association (PSMTI- Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia, EPi¥:a
* 91-j1} ~) and the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI- Perhimpunan Indonesia
Tionghoa, EpJB i¥: ~ l~,~), have branches extended to various parts of Indonesia. The
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objectives of both organisations are to fight for the interests of Chinese Indonesians, to
promote solidarity between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, to promote social and
cultural issues among Chinese Indonesians, and to advocate the entry of Chinese Indonesians
into electoral politics (Suryadinata, 2001, pp. 512-514; Giblin, 2003, pp. 357-358; Hoon,
2008, pp. 77-79).26There are also Chinese Indonesians who actively participate in formal
politics and run for public office under different political parties during general elections.
This reflects the heterogeneous political views of the Chinese. There have been at least three
cabinet ministers who are Chinese.F There have also been several Chinese elected as
parliamentarians and local government heads. The well-known Chinese politicians elected
into public offices include Murdaya Widyawimatra Poo a.k.a. Poo Tjie Goan ({t;t ~),
national parliamentarian for East Java I from 2004 to 2009 and Banten IT in 2009, Hasan
Karman a.k.a. Bong Sau Fan (. d> fL), mayor of Singkawang, West Kalimantan, from
November 2007 to September 2012, Sofyan Tan a.k.a. Tan Kim Yang (,*~1h), national
parliamentarian for North Sumatra I since 2014, and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, known by his
Hakka affectionate nickname, Ahok (~J.j~), governor of Jakarta since 2014.
Moreover, since the advent of democratisation, several Chinese Indonesians have
taken the initiative to actively participate in political activities and social reform movements
to fight for equal rights and an end to discriminatory practices. Hence, the Chinese minority
enjoys a less vulnerable political position in the reformasi era.
26 INTI is actually a breakaway faction of PSMTI. PSMTI established itself as an exclusively ethnic Chinese
organisation in which only Chinese Indonesians could become full members. Non-Chinese Indonesians could
only become honorary members. Some of the original members were uncomfortable with such a policy and had
subsequently left to form INTI. INTI accepts all Indonesian citizens who agree with the objective of the
organisation to join as members (Giblin., 2003, pp. 357-358; Suryadinata, 2001, pp. 513-514).
27 They include Kwik Kian Gie (~It)(), coordinating minister for the economy, finance and industry from
October 1999 to August 2000 under President Abdurrahman Wahid, and state minister/head of the national
planning board from July 2001 to October 2004 under President Megawati Sukamoputri; Mari Elka Pangestu (
i'1:iJ;! ~), minister of trade from October 2004 to 2011 and minister of tourism and creative economy from 2011
to 2014; and Amir Syamsudin a.k.a. Tan Toan Sin., minister of justice and human rights from 2011 to 2014
(Coppel, 2008, p. 120; Primanita & Daslani, 2012; "Minister Mari Elka", 2011; Dermawan T., 2014).
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In addition, the rise of China as an economic power also indirectly changed the
. .
attitude of post-Suharto governments towards Chinese Indonesians. It improved the foreign
relations between Indonesia and China as post-Suharto governments no longer perceive
China as an ideologically threatening country. Instead,they see China "as an economic
powerhouse providing positive spillovers to its cash-strapped neighbours in Southeast Asia"
(Zhao, 2013, p. 4). The Indonesian government is keen to attract more Chinese businesses to
invest and set up enterprises as well as factories in Indonesia in order to accelerate and
expand economic development and the building of infrastructure in the country. These efforts
of the Indonesian government have coincided with China's pursuit of friendly relations with
Southeast Asian countries. A few Chinese organisations in Indonesia are in a good position to
help the government to establish economic ties with China since the leaders are well-
connected to state officials and businesspeople in China. They are thus able to utilise their
intra-ethnic linkages and social networks in China to assist the government to establish
business connections with China (Jiang & Ding, 2011).
Conclusion
From the above discussion, it is clear that the position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians
was shaped by multiple factors. During Dutch colonisation, the government used the Chinese
instead of the indigenous people to fill most economic niches in order to prevent the rise of
an indigenous merchant class that might challenge their position. The Dutch also
implemented 'divide and rule' policy to prevent the Chinese and the indigenous people from
combining forces to challenge them. During the Sukarno years, due to the close relations
between Sukarno and China, the government was relatively tolerant to the ethnic Chinese in
Indonesia by allowing them to keep their ethnic and cultural identities although at the same
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time it also introduced some discriminatory policies to curb Chinese economic dominance
and assist indigenous businesspeople.
After Suharto came into power, due to the anti-communist politics associated with the
Cold War and also the government's ultimate motive to de-politicise the Chinese who were
perceived as a potential 'fifth column' of China in order to prevent any political threat or
opposition, the government imposed forced assimilation policy upon the Chinese but at the
same time restricted them from politics, public service, military and entrance to public
universities.
Nevertheless, the period since the end of the Suharto regime in May 1998 saw the rise
of open-minded Indonesian political leaders such as former presidents Abdurrahman Wahid,
Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as well as the globalisation of the
economic position of China. Post-Suharto governments ended the forced assimilation policy
upon the Chinese and allowed them to openly express their ethnic and cultural identities as .
well as actively participate in politics. A few Chinese organisations in Indonesia also play an
important role in assisting the government to establish economic ties with China since the
leaders are well-connected to state officials and businesspeople in China. Hence, the post-
Suharto era saw the significant improvement in the condition and position of Chinese
Indonesians.
In conclusion, the position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was shaped by both
domestic and external factors. The above discussion indicates that as long as open-minded
political leaders are in power and that both Indonesia and China maintain good foreign
relations with each other, the Chinese in Indonesia will enjoy a less vulnerable and more
secure position.
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